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 Teaching the Bill of Rights in China
 Kurt Mosser
 University of Dayton
 RECENTLY, I WAS ASKED if I was interested in teaching a relatively
 short course on a topic of my choosing at Nanjing University in Nanjing,
 People's Republic of China. I agreed, and designed a course called "Ameri
 can Political Theory" to be taught three days a week for five weeks. Each
 class session would meet for two hours.
 China has changed a great deal over the last few decades, of course.
 That change continues, and the pace of that change continues to acceler
 ate. While I was in Nanjing, the government announced China's seventh
 consecutive quarter of double-digit GDP growth; soon after, PetroChina's
 IPO produced the world's largest company in market value, double that
 of the next-largest, Exxon-Mobil. Whether such growth can continue
 remains to be seen. Whether they can avoid, or even mitigate, their loom
 ing environmental disaster also remains to be seen. Facing a potentially
 perilous future, history becomes that much more vital, but the questions I
 addressed in the course raised a number of issues of relevance not just to
 historians, but also to those who teach humanities, particularly in a context
 so distinct from a more customary situation in the West.
 The course I designed was intended to explore the philosophical
 background of what drove the North American colonists to declare their
 independence; what ideas informed the writing of the Declaration of
 Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights; and what models
 competed in determining the state envisaged. Although my professional
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 training is in philosophy, I was teaching the course under the auspices of
 the History Department at Nanjing University.
 Nanjing University (known, almost exclusively in Nanjing, as "Nanda,"
 an abbreviation of its full Chinese name) is generally regarded as one of
 the best universities in China, ranked just behind Beijing University and
 Shanghai Normal University by virtually everyone I talked to in both
 China and the United States. The students, I had been told, would speak
 English "well," and would be able to follow complex lectures in English.
 I was told, therefore, that I should not alter the content of the course; I
 should teach it just as I would in the United States. In fact, one of the
 reasons for inviting me, I was informed, was to help demonstrate what
 an "American teaching style" would look like. (I decided not to try to
 explain that, even more than most, my teaching was unrepresentative of
 whatever an "American teaching style" would look like, beyond meeting
 in a classroom and conducting the course in English.) I would be teach
 ing a range of students, consisting of advanced undergraduates as well
 as some graduate students, all with substantial backgrounds in American
 history. Talking with others who had taught at Nanjing as well as at other
 highly regarded universities in the PRC, I learned that students would not
 talk in class, and that this would be their uniform expectation, as well as
 the instructor's. I walked into my classroom the first day knowing little
 more than this; I did not know the size of the class, I had no enrollment
 list, and I had not been given any expectations about what kind of assign
 ments I should offer, how to grade the students, or even if I should grade
 the students. Indeed, I was not entirely sure I would have chalk and a
 blackboard (I did). I also learned, fairly early, that my access to the Internet
 would be modest; it would be unlikely that I would be able to gain access
 to the library, and printing and copying materials would be, well, difficult.
 Almost as quickly, I learned that when I was told something was going
 to be "difficult," that was often a euphemism for "not going to happen."
 I was never quite sure if these details were typical for foreign teachers;
 perhaps I could have complained more and obtained some more help, but
 I decided simply to accept what was on hand and go on from there.
 While everyone's experience will differ, perhaps quite dramatically,
 what I learned in and out of the classroom can be useful for others consid
 ering such an undertaking. I spent a good bit of time talking to students
 outside of class, but I also talked to a number of students not taking my
 course, as well as to staff and faculty at Nanda. Finally, I had the oppor
 tunity to talk with Chinese students in both Beijing and Shanghai. While
 my method hardly approaches offering a "scientific" data sample, the
 information I was able to gather does extend well beyond those students
 I taught. In addition to being forced to adapt to teaching in an entirely
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 new context, the Chinese students offered new, valuable, and insightful
 perspectives on the philosophical foundations at the heart of the American
 political experiment. They also had probing questions about the nature and
 limits of rights granted in the various canonical documents of American
 history. Perhaps most important, I came to realize?or remember?just
 how remarkable those documents such as the Declaration of Independence,
 the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and even the Gettysburg Address are as
 statements of political theory, as well as how remarkable were the people
 who produced them.
 Pedagogical Challenges
 The course presented two sets of challenges. One set might be con
 sidered "technical" challenges in actually delivering the course content.
 The second set resides in the traditions, history, and culture of China, and
 the radically distinct conception of the state they presuppose. I will deal
 with the technical challenges here, before later taking up the more difficult
 issues of those presuppositions.
 The fundamental obstacle was, unsurprisingly, language. I quickly
 learned that one person's evaluation of a student's language skills might
 widely diverge from my own. Indeed, it turned out that an extraordinarily
 helpful staff member, whose English I had been consistently assured was
 "excellent," clearly had virtually no idea of what I was saying during sev
 eral extensive conversations. Realizing this is itself progress, of course,
 but if a student does not speak in class, it is difficult to determine just
 how much information is being transmitted. My Chinese was only good
 enough to say things such as "Nimen de Yingwen bi wo de Zhongwen hen
 had"?that is, "your English is much better than my Chinese." Students
 appreciated my attempts at speaking their language, in spite of what was
 no doubt my literal tone-deafness, and I believe it encouraged them to
 speak in class more than they were accustomed to doing. A suggestion
 from a colleague to break the students up into small groups and have each
 group pick a designated speaker worked very well. In each class, such
 groups were organized and asked to focus for about ten minutes either on
 an open-ended question (e.g., "are there limits to freedom of speech, and,
 if so, what are they?") or on more standard, but difficult questions (e.g.,
 "how can a slave-owner declare 'all men are created equal'?"). Such
 small-group work helped break up the somewhat lengthy two-hour ses
 sions, gave the students a chance to talk in a more comfortable setting in
 their native language, offered students practice in speaking English in a
 quasi-public context, and allowed all of them to focus on the issues at stake
 in the subject under discussion. I would leave during these small-group
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 discussions, and they evolved over the course of time into the whole group
 discussing?often quite animatedly?the questions I had provided. Upon
 my return, we had a smooth transition to what is a very unusual situation
 in a Chinese classroom: students interrupting each other, and even once
 or twice interrupting me?with effusive apologies?in order to establish a
 point. Once they felt comfortable making mistakes in English, while being
 encouraged by me to continue the attempt to make their point, my classes
 in China were, at their best, almost indistinguishable from my classes in
 the U.S., in terms of both the quantity and quality of discussion.
 There is an old saying in China that one still encounters: it is hard to
 be Chinese.1 A recognition of China's long history of turmoil and the
 challenges of contemporary life in both rural and urban China, the saying
 also serves as a way of acknowledging that one simply cannot do much
 about certain things. I adopted this approach when I discovered that over
 half of the students from the first day of class did not return, and had been
 replaced by more than an equal number of new students. While one set of
 the same five students came every day, some students came a few times
 never to return, while a few came once a week. I was never given a class
 list, but there were invariably fourteen students in attendance; just never
 the same fourteen. I also was unclear about grading or assignments?after
 the first assignment, I discovered that the course was not to be graded at
 all. Thus, written assignments would not be needed. Students also varied
 greatly in bringing texts to class?there was no assigned textbook, for I
 had hoped to minimize expenses and increase convenience by hyper-link
 ing texts in the public domain to my online syllabus. (Students, I knew,
 had easy access to the Internet; I hadn't known until getting to China that
 it would be so much easier than my own.) Some students would bring
 in not just all the required documents?the Constitution, Bill of Rights,
 Declaration of Independence?but also collections of Lincoln's speeches,
 the entire Federalist Papers, etc. Other students never brought a single text
 to class and gave very little indication that they had even glanced at any
 of the assigned reading. It was also clear that the students varied greatly
 in their background?one student might know the details of the battle of
 Gettysburg, including the strategic importance of Little Round Top, while
 another student might have only the vaguest idea that Lincoln had been
 President after Washington.
 The last, but most fascinating, of these technical challenges was teaching
 history to students whose perception of history diverges so dramatically
 from the perception of my American students. Chinese recorded his
 tory?as the Chinese are fond, and proud, of pointing out?is at least 3,500
 years old. (A linguistic example of this history: a Chinese slang term for
 "idiot," still in common parlance, is an insult stemming from the Warring
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 States period of China?that is, before 221 BCE.) Anything much more
 than 100 years old in the United States is seen by most of my students as
 ancient; in China, that may be considered exceedingly recent. Thus, in
 describing the Loving v. Virginia decision of 1967, when the U.S. Supreme
 Court ruled miscegenation statutes to be unconstitutional, the perception
 of just how long ago 1967 was varied widely between U.S. students and
 Chinese students. There was considerably less difficulty explaining to the
 latter how historical events can have long-lasting and continuing repercus
 sions for contemporary issues. Perhaps even more in China than in the
 American South, though the comment may have become a cliche, one is
 tempted to reach for Faulkner's oft-quoted phrase: in China, the past isn't
 dead; it isn't even past.
 Course Content
 A course on "American political theory," taught under the auspices of
 a Department of History by a teacher who trained and trains exclusively
 in philosophy presented its own share of challenges. The course began
 with a detailed discussion of Aristotle's claim that "All human beings
 [anthropoi] are, by nature, political animals." This was interpreted to
 indicate that, for a human being to function as a human being, he or she
 must live within a community of some sort. For Aristotle, this was apolis,
 or more generally, a state structured by rules, establishing a government
 that proceeds to enforce them. A look into what those rules are intended to
 guarantee took us to various accounts of social contract theory, of Hobbes,
 Locke, Rousseau, and a brief account of John Rawls's version. In this
 way, the attempt was made to identify the rights at stake and the status of
 those rights, as well as to provide two general and competing models. The
 first was discussed in terms of Aristotle, Kong Fuzi (known in the West
 as Confucius), and Marx; the latter in terms of Locke, Adam Smith, and
 Jefferson. The "Confucian" model identified the state as the fundamental
 unit of meaning, which granted individuals their rights and from which
 individuals gained at least part of their identity. The "Jeffersonian" model
 identified the individual as the fundamental unit of meaning, regarded
 certain "natural" rights as inalienable, and tended to be quite suspicious
 of government, which, in any case, ruled by "consent of the governed."
 These two models allowed us to interpret a number of different American
 political debates while recognizing that these were not discrete models, but
 general conceptions that regarded and weighed the relationship between
 citizen and state in quite different ways. At that point, we could introduce
 the Declaration of Independence as a formal statement that the implied
 social contract between the colonies and Britain was null and void, thus
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 explaining why so much of that document consists of the specification of
 the wrongs incurred by the colonists that abrogated the implied contract.
 In this way, the Constitution could be presented as a detailed outline of
 a government by those influenced by Locke, de Tracy, Montesquieu, and
 others, recognizing the potential for abuse by any one branch of govern
 ment, and addressing that by developing a system of "checks and balances."
 With certain prominent figures dissatisfied with the document as it stood,
 the Bill of Rights was added to specify certain crucial rights, as well as to
 note that any rights not so specified were not thereby abrogated. It was
 completed by the very Jeffersonian Tenth Amendment, remanding to the
 States all rights not explicitly granted to the Federal Government.
 After extensive discussion of each of the Ten Amendments of the Bill
 of Rights?including an account of what may now seem to be the wholly
 anachronous Third Amendment?students were asked to write about one
 of the Amendments (for a complex Amendment, they were allowed to
 focus on one part of it), explain the language of the Amendment, provide
 a justification for it, and identify potential problems that might arise from
 taking a right (free speech, for example) to an extreme. This was before
 I learned no written assignments were anticipated by the students?or
 by Nanda's Department of History?but I was gratified when a student
 insisted that the Bill of Rights does not grant rights; it functions to protect
 rights that all citizens already possess by the laws of nature. This is an
 important distinction, fundamental to the Declaration of Independence,
 that is often misunderstood by even some of my best American students.
 The written work varied in the same way the students' spoken abilities did;
 these brief papers ranged from virtual downloads from websites to papers
 that were as good as those I receive from my undergraduate students in
 the United States.
 We were then able to move quickly to the Civil War and discuss whether
 Jefferson, Adams, Madison, and others had constructed a political situ
 ation in which war was simply inevitable. This allowed us to complete
 the course by contrasting various events in American history?including
 such important court cases as Dred Scott v. Sandford, Plessy v. Ferguson,
 Korematsu v. United States, Brown v. Board of Education, Griswold v.
 Connecticut?with the political theory enunciated with America's found
 ing documents. A final topic was the 1892 Chinese Exclusion Act, which
 I included not simply because I knew the students would be interested,
 but also because it provides a sharp contrast between the theoretical views
 of the Founding Documents and the actual events that took place, often
 carried out by agents appealing precisely to those views.
 Clearly, such a course moving as rapidly as this will greatly oversim
 plify certain important issues. My Chinese students may well not have
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 been able, at the course's end, to explain the causal relationship between
 the Wilmot Proviso and the Kansas-Nebraska Act, although I daresay few
 of my American students would be able to do so either. Two surprising
 results, however, emerged from what did take place in the classroom.
 First, several students identified an immersion in material culture as dis
 tracting citizens from important roles citizens should play in a political
 community, and noted an analogous phenomenon in contemporary Chinese
 urban life. None of these students, to my knowledge, had ever heard of
 the Frankfurt School, but came quite close to articulating in its basics the
 School's critique of post-industrial material culture?with the interesting
 twist of applying it to a culture that is quite material, but, with some 800
 million rural residents, not quite post-industrial. Second, students came to
 relate the Confucian model of a strong central state, to which the rights of
 citizens are at times secondary, with a general tradition in Chinese history
 before 1949 and after. Interestingly enough, they tended to argue that such
 a "Confucian" model was, at times, surprisingly similar to some of the
 positions argued for by Alexander Hamilton. Whether that argument can
 be sustained or not is debatable, but the perspective that it brings to issues
 of both American history and contemporary American political culture is
 certainly provocative.
 Alexander Hamilton Meets Confucius
 As noted above, the structuring conceit of the course was to contrast the
 desire for a strong Federal Government?a position often identified with
 Alexander Hamilton?with the demand that individual rights were para
 mount, and, in a fundamental sense, a strong central government is to be
 feared. The latter position is frequently characterized as Jeffersonian.
 This framework made it relatively simple to sketch the arguments of
 the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights.
 Admittedly, the framework certainly oversimplified things?thus, some
 of the objections that Adams expressed to Jefferson, the many different
 arguments of the Anti-Federalists, and other similar important but detailed
 issues were omitted. In this particular context, however, oversimplification
 was a virtue. Using this approach, I was able not only to contrast the views
 of the Federalists from the Jeffersonian Republicans, but I also was able to
 explain how various issues that have since animated American history?
 chief among them the Civil War?grew out of the debate that was at this
 framework's heart. Virtually all of the disputes of American politics?both
 historical and contemporary?it could be argued, fall somewhere within a
 continuum between an extreme Jeffersonian individualism and an equally
 extreme Hamiltonian?or perhaps "quasi-Hamiltonian"?centralism.2
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 The theory behind Jefferson's view is relatively straightforward, and
 is stated explicitly in the opening of the Declaration. All human beings
 are "endowed by their Creator" with unalienable rights, granted to them
 by "laws of nature"; no one?particularly a state whose legitimacy rests
 solely on the "consent of the governed"?can justifiably deny these rights
 without due cause. Drawing on Locke's Second Treatise of Government,
 among other texts, Jefferson provides an eloquent and powerful statement
 of the supremacy of the individual. This model is a familiar one; it has
 been variously interpreted, and has given rise to such views as libertarian
 ism, where, as argued influentially by Robert Nozick in his Anarchy, State,
 and Utopia, the state has little legitimate role beyond the enforcement of
 contracts and providing domestic security and protection from enemies
 outside the state's borders. This model has also proved influential with
 the greater public, given such paeans to individualism as Milton and
 Rose Friedman's Free to Choose, Ayn Rand's embrace of The Virtue of
 Selfishness, and Gordon Gekko's famous "Greed is good?Greed works"
 speech in the Oliver Stone film, Wall Street. Whether or not it is fair to
 burden Jefferson with these later interpretations, it is clear enough that he
 regarded the individual as the fundamental unit of meaning in politics that
 felt government threatened that individual, and believed a more powerful
 government corresponded to a greater threat.
 The Hamiltonian model has received less attention and is, perhaps, less
 well-known among Americans even as a competing model. It certainly
 has not played an explicit, or even prominent, role in many recent politi
 cal campaigns. Joseph Ellis gives a succinct description of the view in
 his characterization of John Jay's The Life of George Washington. As
 Ellis puts it, Jay's view of the core revolutionary idea was collectivism
 not individualistic:
 [It] does not regard the individual as the sovereign unit in the political
 equation and is more comfortable with governmental discipline as a focus
 ing and channeling device for national development. In its more extreme
 forms it relegates personal rights and liberties to the higher authority of the
 state, which is "us" and not "them," and it therefore has both communal
 and despotic implications.3
 While relatively absent from the rise of conservative politics during Gold
 water through Nixon, Wallace, Reagan, and on, this view is not entirely
 absent from American political discourse, particularly in issues that require
 national purpose (e.g., the "global war on terror," the exploration of space,
 and concerns about environmental degradation). In turn, appeals to a
 strong central authority as necessary for fighting terrorism, for example,
 have provoked substantial criticism precisely from those who fear that
 authority?to wiretap without a warrant, to restrict or deny habeas corpus,
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 to employ the technique of "extreme rendition"?threatens civil liberties.
 It is, of course, criticism grounded in the Jeffersonian conception of an
 individualism that is ever-vigilant about the tendency for government to
 expand its power beyond its legitimate role. It should be clear from these
 examples that this framework is not easily reconciled with the lazy division
 of American politics into "conservative/liberal" or "right/left."
 Employing this framework worked admirably in explaining to my
 Chinese students not only many of specific court cases mentioned above
 and the arguments that were maintained there, but also the debates of the
 founders. The students found it particularly interesting to see the Southern
 perspective on the Civil War.4 Bracketing the moral question of slavery
 during the time of Jefferson, Madison, and others, from the slave owner's
 perspective, laws eliminating the importation of slaves, restricting the
 number of new slave states, and intimating that the "peculiar institution"
 would soon be terminated would be illegitimate acts of a Federal Gov
 ernment, relative to an individual's property. From that perspective, the
 Declaration of Independence indicated that such authority over individuals
 was inherently unjust, and gave slave owners not only the right, but in fact
 the duty to "throw off such government."
 In addition to promoting active and valuable class discussion, this
 approach provided a useful strategy for allowing students to put a great
 number of American historical and contemporary political debates into a
 helpful context. But the contrast also allowed me, slowly, to realize that
 most of the students viewed this whole set of issues as might cultural
 anthropologists, rather than historians or political theorists.5 Most of the
 presuppositions?not just of the Jeffersonian conception, but also the
 Hamiltonian conception of government?were almost entirely alien to
 anything in Chinese history before 1949. In many ways, things changed
 with the birth of a revolutionary People's Republic of China; however, it
 is not only hard to be Chinese, it is also hard to ignore over 3,500 years
 of Chinese history. The contrast between that history and the principles
 underlying the American "experiment" was profound and informative,
 perhaps most of all to the instructor.
 Without pretending to have some sort of expertise in a field where I
 clearly do not?namely, the history of Chinese philosophy?certain things
 are still fairly clear, even to the novice. Fundamental to the history of China
 is the influence of Kong Fuzi, or Confucius. While challenged in certain
 ways by Buddhism as well as the domestic influence of the Legalist school,
 the precepts of Confucius were paramount in educating and informing the
 Emperors and their officials, in training civil servants, and in providing
 the content of the famously rigorous exams that were so constitutive of
 the life of anyone seeking to improve his (generally not her) station in life.
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 Jefferson may be able to claim that the rights he, along with many other
 thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, had identified were
 "natural" rights, and thus eternal, constant, unchanging, and unalienable.
 But in spite of the fact that there was a long history of discussions of natural
 rights, the idea that a state's legitimacy stemmed from the consent of the
 governed was relatively young. That the government granted its citizens
 rights, and thus could restrict them as it saw necessary, is a doctrine with
 a much longer pedigree. On that view, a citizen's identity is essentially
 connected with the state; one isn't a person who happens to be Greek or
 Chinese; one is Greek, or one is Chinese. In the hands of Confucius and
 his followers, such as Mencius, this gave powerful support to the leader
 of that state, mandating obedience to his dictates were not just morally
 required, but functioned as a fundamental part of one's self-conception.
 The Emperor was to be respected?and thus obeyed?just as natural as
 night follows day, or a triangle has three sides: it is what it meant to be
 the Emperor. Similarly, for everyone else, obedience to the Emperor was
 what it meant to be Chinese.
 The traditional analogies for characterizing the interaction between the
 Emperor and his subjects?a telling term?were the relationship of the
 husband and the wife, and the relationship of the father and the child (given
 the masculine form of the parent figure, it is probably sufficiently clear
 that the child in question was usually the son). This was hardly unique
 to the tradition of Confucianism; at almost the same time as Confucius
 (551-479 BCE), Socrates was drawing on precisely the same analogy in
 the "Apology." There, he states explicitly that the relationship between
 the citizen and the state is in all fundamental respects that between the
 parent and the child: one of respect and obedience.6
 It should be pretty obvious why, on such a Confucian model, it is so
 difficult to explain the very idea of the "consent of the governed" as if it is
 a legitimate and viable expectation. It was clear that students intellectually
 understood such a notion was a fundamental principle of American politics.
 At the same time, it is an utterly alien notion to impose it on the Chinese
 traditional model, akin to saying that a father's authority in a household
 extends only so far as the children living in the household have granted him
 authority. If the Bill of Rights guarantees rights to the governed that are
 natural and unalienable, in this analogy, one could suggest that a parent's
 ability to search a child's room is restricted by rights guaranteed to the
 parented against search, as they are in the Fourth Amendment. Any such
 analogies can extend only so far. But if one begins with the premise, or
 assumption, that the leader of a state is due deference not because of the
 consent of those he leads, but because of divine guidance, the perspective
 on what comprises basic rights is fundamentally altered. I had decided
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 in my class not to draw a great number of comparisons among the leader
 ship of the PRC, its stated principles, and the actual facts on the political
 ground, in part because those comparisons can raise extremely sensitive
 issues not just with government officials, but with students as well. Such
 comparisons would also have taken the course away from its focus on
 American political theory; it was not a course on comparative politics.
 But when such topics did come up, they provided fascinating contrast
 between what students were willing to say in class and what they were
 willing to say to me as an individual. In any case, more than one student
 told me?privately?that there was little in-principle difference between
 the autocratic rule currently in power in the PRC and the millennia-old
 tradition of Imperial orders being issued with little expectation that they
 would be refused. The leadership of the PRC may quarrel with this evalu
 ation, and may be justified in doing so, but on the other hand, it was clear
 that this perspective was held by not just a few.
 One brief example I offered in class not only brought out this partici
 pation contrast, it silenced an often talkative classroom and provoked a
 number of students to insist outside of class that I understand the views
 they were unwilling to offer in public. In the English-language China Daily
 (the only English nationwide paper), which fairly obviously just reflects the
 Party line, there was a front-page story on the 2008 Olympics in Beijing.
 In a prominently displayed upper-fold story, "Marches Require Approval,"
 there was an announcement reminding anyone wishing to organize a march
 that they had to recognize the Constitutional limits to such activities. The
 article went on to specify that "such activities must not violate the Con
 stitution, harm the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State,
 instigate divisions among the people [emphasis mine] or endanger public
 security."7 I told the class I understood that running a country of 1.3 bil
 lion people, with fifty-six ethnic groups, was a daunting task, and may
 well justify certain kinds of restrictions. At the same time, it was unclear
 that any American would think it even worth marching if there were not
 a potential to "instigate divisions among the people"?that would be the
 reason for marching. As had happened before, there were times when the
 ideas that seemed so basic to the American conception of freedom?in
 this case shared by both Hamilton and Jefferson, and even by most of their
 followers?appeared utterly distinct from the Chinese conception of the
 state. More than one student told me?again, privately?that in this case,
 there was little difference between such political activities under the Ming
 and Qing Dynasties and the PRC. Indeed, during some periods after the
 Revolution, such behavior was considerably riskier. More than one student
 and staff member revealed to me, along the way, how little the current
 generation is aware of the Tiananmen pro-democracy demonstrations and
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 Strong Central State  Strong Individual Rights
 K  H  An
 A: Absolute State Authority
 K: Kong Fuzi/Confucius
 H: Hamilton
 J: Jefferson
 An: Anarchy/Absolute individual rights
 C: CCP/PRC (2007) [?]
 Figure 1: Spectrum of Conceptualizations on Authority and Freedom
 subsequent crackdown, particularly in any detail. Indeed, I was told by a
 very knowledgeable Chinese source that Tiananmen is "the one thing that
 isn't to be discussed." This is not to defend a bourgeois notion of individual
 freedom; rather, it is to support the idea that explaining the American
 Constitution?and perhaps even more so the Bill of Rights?requires
 recognizing that such an explanation operates within a context of specific
 assumptions and presuppositions. As Jefferson saw, perhaps as much as
 anyone until Lincoln, this meant that extending some fundamental sense
 of the freedoms outlined in the Bill of Rights requires those assumptions
 and presuppositions to be given critical scrutiny and, if possible, defense.
 A fluidity on the authority granting natural rights emerges.
 To represent various models of state power versus individual rights, our
 class came up with a graphic ranging from an unquestionable state power
 to absolutely inviolable individual rights at the extremes (see Figure 1).
 This was useful for explaining that few, if any, examples can be found
 of long-term situations that reside at either extreme end of the spectrum.
 Thus, there is always a question of proportion and balance between state
 authority and individual freedom. On the other hand, it was considerably
 easier to identify successfully those states that approached the "strong
 central state" extreme than a situation where a "strong individual rights"
 extreme would be an appropriate characterization.
 The graphic was particularly useful in making clear that the longstand
 ing and influential Confucian tradition in Chinese tradition begins closer
 than Hamilton to a conception of a strong central state. Thus Hamilton's
 position, which of course advocates a much stronger central government
 than Jefferson's, still begins with a far stronger commitment to individual
 ism and to the inherent rights of the individual than anything ever seen in
 Chinese history. Individuals' situation did not change structurally with
 the events of either the 1912 or, ultimately, the 1949 Revolution. In this
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 sense, then, teaching about Hamilton's commitment to individual rights
 is quite problematic, even more so when trying to explain and evaluate
 Jefferson's considerably more radical commitment to those individual
 rights. In class, no one offered to identify where the current Chinese
 Communist Party (CCP) would fall on this scale, although a number of
 students acknowledged? more candidly outside of class8?that it would
 almost certainly be somewhere around the "K" on the graphic, perhaps to
 the right of Kong Fuzi.
 History and Contemporary China
 From my students, and from others with whom I discussed such issues,
 I encountered two recurring concerns. First, the worry that China was
 losing what was consistently referred to as its "elegance." Second, that
 Chinese economic growth and development had led to a situation where
 urban Chinese were considerably more focused on consumption of mate
 rial goods than any specific political developments in terms of rights or,
 more generally, democracy. Fundamentally, these two issues came very
 close to being two sides of the same coin.
 When students, faculty, and others mentioned dwindling "elegance" as
 a troubling consequence of China's development, they generally cited the
 long history of art, literature, and painting, as well as the more abstract
 philosophical ideas associated with Lao Tze, Confucius, the Buddha, and
 others. In short, if one's attention is riveted on consuming durable goods,
 there is considerably less attention being paid to the cultural heritage so
 important to the Chinese self-conception. My students were well-aware of
 this discrepancy and were clearly troubled by it. This seemed to be con
 firmed during my time in Shanghai: it was quite easy to discover shop after
 shop offering an enormous range of (Western) luxury goods. Meanwhile,
 a visit to the home of Lu Xun, often regarded as the greatest Chinese liter
 ary figure of the twentieth century, offered nothing beyond a few plaques
 noting the location. There was scant evidence that the "museum" allegedly
 devoted to this remarkable writer was functioning; there were certainly no
 people around to indicate otherwise. Thus, again, appears the paradox that
 confronts one in contemporary China: history is inescapable, whether in
 the teachings of Confucius or Mao?yet that history seems to be neglected
 in the context of China's current economic development. History, in that
 sense, is both everywhere in China and nowhere.
 At the same time, this is a state that less than fifty years ago saw a famine
 that killed, according to current estimates, 30 million Chinese.9 In such
 contexts, perhaps "rights" and "democracy" are abstractions that simply are
 not of immediate relevance. Or, as some of those I encountered in China
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 pointed out, the choices made in consuming various goods and services
 were a viable substitute for the more substantial kinds of political choices
 theoretically open to those in democratic societies. As one Chinese friend
 described of the current political setting of China, the Party is happy to
 seek to generate a moderately prosperous society while it recognizes the
 threat of income polarity, particularly between urban and rural populations.
 The result of this choice substitution is the expectation that genuine and
 meaningful political participation, which carries with it the real possibility
 of change, will not be sought. It is a trade-off many Chinese are happy
 to make, and is quite possibly made more palatable by the unavoidable
 history of Chinese politics that has never been modeled on anything but
 an authoritarian structure. Feeding the state's population and giving many
 of them previously unheard of economic choices and opportunities may
 be seen as a beneficial trade-off. Or, it may more cynically be regarded as
 state authority convincing a potentially troublesome population that their
 attention should be directed toward shopping rather than political change.
 Many of those making the latter point had read surprisingly little Marx,
 or much radical social theory at all, beyond some rather perfiinctory sum
 maries. Yet the critique that I encountered, with some frequency, could
 have been taken straight out of Marcuse's One Dimensional Man.
 The contrast between the average urban Chinese citizen and the average
 urban American citizen is revealing. One lives in a single-party system,
 with a command economy (albeit with important market-based structural
 characteristics); the other lives in pluralistic democracy with an economy
 committed, at least in theory, to fundamental tenets of laissez-faire free
 market mechanisms. One has relatively minimal official access to outside
 (i.e., Western) media (no one could seriously consider the media in China
 open and free); the other, when inclined, has virtually unlimited access
 to every media outlet in existence.10 One rarely, if ever, votes in an elec
 tion beyond a local level that could be regarded as truly "meaningful";
 the other is given the opportunity to vote on a regular basis, from local to
 federal levels, in elections that are free, fair, and open. Yet, while I would
 not dare suggest that the differences here are not fundamental, it is worth
 considering just how different the perceptions are of the vast majority
 of both groups of citizens in gaining effective access to political power
 and generating significant change in policies they regard as harmful?or,
 perhaps, how similar those perceptions are.
 Conclusion
 On the long flight back to the United States, I read Peter Kessler's
 beautifully written and insightful River Town, an account of teaching for
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 two years in a small and relatively remote town in Sichuan Province. I
 was particularly intrigued by this comment:
 Every year at the beginning of the American section of my literature course,
 we read the Declaration of Independence, which was in the textbooks.
 The Chinese publisher had included the Declaration because it smacked of
 revolution, which was always an appropriate subject for Chinese students.
 They never would have included the American Constitution or the Bill of
 Rights.11
 Kessler's determination of the publisher's reason for including the Dec
 laration is, of course, sheer conjecture; he may be right, which may also
 be why Ho Chi Minh viewed that same document as fundamental to what
 he was trying to achieve in Viet Nam. At the same time, the Declaration
 includes a ringing and explicit endorsement, not just of the idea that a
 government is only legitimate if it serves at the "consent of the governed,"
 but also of a considerably more "Jeffersonian" conception of the social
 contract than that found in the Constitution.
 What I found particularly striking about Kessler's remark was that the
 text I used was the American Constitution and the Bill of Rights, supple
 mented by other documents fundamental to American history, Lincoln's
 Gettysburg Address being chief among them. Our situations were quite
 different, of course: Kessler was in a small school that drew its students
 largely from the rural peasant children of Sichuan; my students were
 urban and middle class, had had substantial exposure to Western ideas
 and texts, and attended one of China's major universities. Kessler spoke
 Chinese well; I did not. He was in China for two years, while I was there
 for a little less than two months. Finally, ten years had elapsed between
 his time in Sichuan Province and mine in Jiangsu Province; a mere blip in
 the context of Chinese history, but an eternity in terms of China's recent
 economic development.
 At the same time, there was simply no surprise at, or resistance to, my
 choice of texts. I knew some of my students were Party members, and any
 thing I said in class, I was certain, would be available?if not reported?to
 any interested parties. There was some reluctance among my students at
 discussing particularly controversial topics, and I never mentioned in class
 the Tiananmen demonstrations, Falun Gong, or the Gang of Four. At the
 same time, I never consciously avoided drawing contrasts, when relevant,
 between the liberties available to American citizens and those available
 to the Chinese. Beyond the two specific topics just mentioned, I never
 hesitated to raise issues that brought into sharp focus the political freedoms
 described in the Bill of Rights, sometimes implicitly but also explicitly
 considering those freedoms in the context of contemporary Chinese poli
 tics. During a guest lecture at another university, I was asked quite directly
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 about China's "inadequate democracy." I did not hesitate in noting that
 a true test of free speech is permitting speech that political leaders find
 challenging, noxious, and even threatening, indicating that China's com
 mitment to democracy may soon be confronting this challenge. None of
 these comments or discussions was met with anything but curiosity and
 more questions, and with useful and provocative inquiries as to the limits
 of the kinds of rights articulated in the Bill of Rights. Neither students,
 faculty, nor administrators registered any objections to my pursuit of these
 topics. To be sure, the situation may be, and probably is, quite different
 for a native faculty member than it was for a Western professor brought
 in for a short period, as I was.
 For its entire history, Chinese politics has been grounded in an authori
 tarian model, whether an Emperor whose virtually unlimited authority was
 justified by Confucius (among other ways), or a Party Secretary whose
 virtually unlimited authority was justified by Mao Zedong (and now, sig
 nificantly, supplemented by the developmental theories of Deng Xiaoping).
 With China's current remarkable stage of rapid economic development, it
 will be fascinating to see how that authoritarian model attempts to main
 tain political power with an increasingly educated, increasingly urban,
 and increasingly technologically sophisticated citizenry?precisely the
 kind of citizenry that seems, almost inevitably, to seek greater personal
 and political freedom. It will be equally fascinating to see if and how the
 traditional Chinese conception that defers to the central political authority
 will be appealed to by those who seek to maintain their political power.
 Notes
 1. The point is put more poetically by Andrea Louie in her novel Moon Cakes (New
 York: Ballantine, 1995), 315: "To be Chinese, I am beginning to think, is to accept the
 difficulty of being human."
 2. I insert this qualification in order not to accuse Hamilton of being guilty of such a
 strong conception of central state power as to qualify as a fascist. The term "Hamiltonian,"
 in any case, is a mere label used to contrast his position with Jefferson's, and is not meant
 to carry too much historical or conceptual weight.
 3. Joseph Ellis, Founding Brothers (New York: Vintage, 2002), 14.
 4. Of course, the question of the morality of slavery cannot be "bracketed"; the
 Constitution's notorious three-fifths clause makes that clear enough. One of the most
 interesting discussions of the course focused on whether, given how the Constitution
 and Bill of Rights were written, the Civil War was, in 1789, inevitable. Historians have
 been debating this issue at least since 1861; all of this was completely new to my Chinese
 students. Even those who had read a fair amount about the War had never realized there
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 even was a "Southern perspective" on the legitimacy of secession, beyond some inchoate
 notion of "defending slavery." This is not, of course, to claim the position is defensible,
 but to claim that there was a position.
 5. This became most explicitly obvious during discussions of the relationship be
 tween certain issues in contemporary American politics?such as abortion?and religion.
 It quickly became clear that it would be almost impossible to explain, without devoting the
 entire course to the topic, the role religion played and plays in American politics? particu
 larly to those who live in a state that regards itself officially as atheist, tolerates to some
 extent a wide diversity of religious and spiritual views, and whose citizens have what might
 be called, at best, an ambivalent (and certainly complex) relationship to such matters.
 6. This is also shown in the etymological connection in Greek between "father"
 (pater) and "country" (patris); thus one who shows proper respect for the authority of the
 state?that is, treats it as a good son treats his father?is, literally, a patriot. It should also
 be pointed out that obedience does not entail blind obedience, either for Socrates or for
 Confucianism. Socrates has an extended discussion of the doctrine "persuade or obey"
 in the Crito, where he argues that disobedience is justified in certain cases. Similarly,
 Mencius (372-289 BCE), a chief exponent of Confucianism, identifies as one of the three
 unfilial acts the blind acquiescence in one's parent's wrongdoing. In both cases, however,
 there must be, in case of disobedience, an argument to be made that the disobedience was
 justified.
 7. "Marches Require Approval," China Daily 2 November 2007, p. 1.
 8. I have mentioned a few times that students were willing to tell me things indi
 vidually that they may not have felt comfortable in saying in a more public context; this
 should not be taken to imply that there was any particular pressure being exerted to prevent
 such free expression. Indeed, except for perhaps discussion of the Tiananmen events,
 there were no such restrictions I observed. The reluctance to offer political statements in
 class may have been caused by any number of reasons, many of which are no doubt the
 same kinds of reasons I encounter in the U.S. I should note, as well, that during a guest
 lecture to seventy-five or so students at the Nanjing University of Finance and Economics,
 during a very public question and answer session, one student stood up and quite directly
 and forthrightly noted the inadequacies of the current Chinese commitment to democracy.
 This did not seem to strike anyone there as particularly unusual.
 9. See Peng Xizhe, "Demographic Consequences of the Great Leap Forward in
 China's Provinces," Population and Development Review 13, no. 4 (1987): 639-670.
 10. The Internet here, as elsewhere, makes things complicated. On the one hand,
 most are familiar with the restrictions the PRC has placed on access to Internet sites; on
 the other hand, I found very little difficulty, when I was able to go online, to access ev
 erything I read when online in the U.S., with the exception of some blogs. Several of my
 acquaintances assured me that it was not terribly difficult to get around those restrictions.
 They also noted that their sources of news from the U.S. included the New York Times, the
 Washington Post, and the major television networks and cable outlets. Indeed, they were
 particularly interested in my giving them sources for independent and "alternative" media
 perspectives, indicating little concern that they would be unable to gain access to them.
 11. Peter Hessler, River Town (New York: Harper Collins, 2001), 270.
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